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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 950246-CA

v.

:

BRIAN MAGUIRE

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 3

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Brian Maguire appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to correct sentence (R. 765). The trial court imposed
the sentence on defendant's plea to aggravated assault, a third
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (R.
632).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).

1

STATEMENT QF ISSUES ANP STANDARDS QF APPELLATE REVIEW1
1.

Can defendant establish ineffective assistance of trial

counsel based on counsel's failure to challenge the legality of
his second sentence either at the time the trial court imposed it
or on direct appeal when defendant can challenge the legality of
his sentence at any time?
This claim presents a question of law reviewed on the trial
record because defendant presents it for the first time on appeal
without a prior evidentiary hearing.

State v. Ellifritz. 835

P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).
2,

Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) preclude a more

severe second sentence against a defendant after he has rescinded
the plea agreement that resulted in the earlier, more lenient
sentence?
Because this issue involves the interpretation of statutes

defendant has filed both his original brief and a
"supplemental" brief. With one exception, the supplemental brief
contains the complete text of the arguments raised in defendant's
original brief; therefore, it appears defendant intends his
supplemental brief to be a replacement brief, and the State will
address only the issues raised in that brief.
The only issue not restated in
whether the trial court erroneously
transcribe the relevant proceedings
Because the State has since ordered
is now moot.
2

the supplemental brief is
refused defendant's motion to
at the State's expense.
those transcripts, that issue

and case law, it presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness.
3.

State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).

Does double jeopardy require that defendant receive

credit for the time he served on his parole revocation for a
murder conviction against his sentence imposed on his guilty plea
to aggravated assault?
This presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
State v. Davis. 903 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah 1995), cert» granted,
(Utah 1996).

However, defendant's failure to raise this issue in

the trial court and failure on appeal to establish plain error or
exceptional circumstances precludes appellate review of the
merits of this issue.

State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah

App. 1993).
4.

Does double jeopardy preclude imposing a higher

sentence after defendant successfully challenges his no contest
plea even though the trial court credited the full time he served
on the original sentence against the subsequent sentence?
See standard of review for issue three.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-402
(1995)(conviction to next lower degree), 76-3-405
(1995)(limitation on second sentence for same crime), 76-5-103
3

(1995) (aggravated assault), 76-5-105 (1995)(mayhem), and 76-81001 (1990)(habitual criminal statute); and rule 22(e), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.2
STATEMENT OF THE CASK
By information dated December 7, 1987, the State charged
defendant with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and
mayhem, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 765-103 (1995) and 76-5-105 (1995) (R. 28). By amended information
dated January 2, 1988, the State added a third count charging
defendant with being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 31-33).
On April 21, 1988, defendant pleaded no contest to
aggravated assault, and the trial court granted the State's
motion to dismiss the other two counts (R. 111-113).

On April

22, 1988, the trial court lowered the degree to a class A
misdemeanor and sentenced defendant to not more than one year in
prison to run concurrently with any other sentences (R. 114).
By letter dated June 27, 1988, defendant moved to withdraw
his no contest plea (R. 116, 121). Defendant filed a formal
motion to withdraw his plea on August 10, 1988 (R. 124). The

2

The editions cited contain the statutory language in effect
in 1987.
4

trial court denied his motion (R. 260) - This Court reversed that
determination in an unpublished opinion, and the supreme court
affirmed this Court's disposition.

state v. Macruire. 830 P.2d

216, 217-18 (Utah 1991).
On remand, defendant again pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault, and the State again moved to dismiss the mayhem and
habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68).
On this plea, the trial court imposed the statutorily
prescribed zero-to-five-year prison sentence and ordered it to
run consecutively with any other sentences defendant was then
serving (R. 632, 881-87).

The trial court also gave defendant

credit for the time he served on his previous no contest plea (R.
632, 880).
Defendant filed a motion to correct the sentence, contending
that the trial court illegally imposed the zero-to-five-year
consecutive sentence because it was more severe than the sentence
imposed on his original no-contest plea (R. 636-54, 739-45).

The

trial court denied the motion in a signed minute entry dated
March 17, 1995 (R. 765) .3 Defendant timely filed his notice of
appeal challenging the denial of his motion to correct sentence

3

The minute entry has no file stamp date.
5

(R.

774).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

While on parole from a prior murder conviction, defendant
tore off the top third of his grandmother's ear (R. 29, 111, 408,
443, 447-50, €26) .
After the State charged defendant, a parole supervisor filed
an information on parole violation, citing the mayhem and
aggravated assault charges as two of four bases for revoking
parole (R. 133, 654, 663, 670, 700).
The State charged defendant with aggravated assault, a third
degree felony; mayhem, a second degree felony; and being an
habitual criminal, a first degree felony (R. 31-33).

Defendant

ultimately pleaded no contest to the third degree felony
aggravated assault charge in exchange for the State's agreement
to dismiss the mayhem and habitual criminal charges, to recommend
reducing the third degree felony aggravated assault to a class A
misdemeanor, and to permit him to withdraw the plea if the trial
court refused the reduced sentence recommendation (R. 111-12; Tr.
April 21, 1988 at 2, 5-6, 8-9). The trial court granted the
motion to reduce the sentence, sentenced defendant to a prison
term not to exceed one year, and ordered the prison sentence to
run concurrently with any other sentence (R. 114; Tr. April 21,
6

1988 at 14-15).
In reliance on his no-contest plea to aggravated assault,
the Board of Pardons revoked defendant's parole on the prior
murder conviction (R. 133, 655, 670, 673). Defendant remains
incarcerated on the parole revocation (R. 877).
Defendant succeeded on an appellate challenge to his nocontest plea.

State v. Maouire. 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992).

Part way through his trial on the reinstated charges,
defendant initiated plea negotiations (R. 863). Pursuant to the
resulting plea agreement, defendant again pleaded guilty to third
degree felony aggravated assault, and the State again moved to
dismiss the mayhem and habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26,
866-68).

This time, however, defendant did not move for and the

State did not agree to recommend reducing the sentence to a class
A misdemeanor (isLJ . Consequently, the trial court sentenced
defendant to a zero-to-five year prison term without any
objection from defendant (R. 632, 881-87).

Over defendant's

objection, the trial court also ordered the sentence to run
consecutively with defendant's sentence on his revoked parole

(idJ.
In a subsequent motion to correct his sentence, defendant
challenged both the increased prison term and the order making
7

the sentence consecutive (R. 636-54, 379-45).
The argument sections below contain additional relevant
facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Ineffective assistance.

Defendant contends trial

counsel provided him with inadequate representation because
counsel did not challenge the legality of defendant's sentence
either at the time the trial court imposed it or by means of
direct appeal.

However, defendant has not established either

element of an ineffectiveness claim.

First, defendant has not

established deficient performance: nothing in this record shows
that he ever instructed counsel to file a motion to correct the
sentence or to challenge its legality on direct appeal.

Second,

defendant has not and cannot establish the failure undermines
confidence in the outcome.

Because defendant can challenge the

legality of his sentence at any time, he can and is fully
litigating its legality.
2.

Limitation on harsher sentences.

Defendant contends

that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) precluded imposing a
second, harsher sentence after he successfully challenged the nocontest plea that supported the first, more lenient sentence.
Utah cases have considered how this section applies to
8

No

convictions obtained and sentences imposed pursuant to plea
agreements.

However, when defendant successfully challenged his

original plea, he rescinded the original plea agreement,
requiring the trial court to return the parties to their preagreement positions. That remedy required treating defendant as
though the first sentence never existed; therefore, the statute's
protections were never triggered.
3.

Double jeopardy.

Defendant claims double jeopardy

precluded imposing a sentence on his aggravated assault plea that
runs consecutively to his prison term on his parole revocation
because the both prison terms arise from the same facts.
Defendant failed to preserve this argument below and has not
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal;
therefore, the Court need not reach its merits. Alternatively,
double jeopardy permits using the same facts to support both a
criminal conviction and a parole revocation; therefore, the
argument also fails on its merits.
4.

Completion of first sentence.

Defendant contends that

double jeopardy, due process, and equal protection precluded
imposing the second sentence because he had completed the first.
Defendant failed to preserve this argument below and has not
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal;
9

therefore, the Court need not reach its merits. Moreover,
defendant supports the argument with no analysis or authority;
this independently relieves the court of considering the claim on
its merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT MAY CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF A
SENTENCE AT ANY TIME, HE CANNOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED ON COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
CHALLENGE THE ILLEGALITY AT SENTENCING OR ON DIRECT
APPEAL
In Point II of his supplemental brief, defendant claims
trial counsel represented him ineffectively by not challenging
the legality of his second sentence either at the time the trial
court imposed it or on direct appeal.4

In order to establish he

4

In Point I, defendant claims that the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to correct his allegedly illegal
sentence. The State concedes that, if this Court determines the
sentence is illegal, then the trial court committed reversible
error by not correcting it.
In that same argument, defendant complains that the trial
court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion. To the
extent defendant intends this statement as a separate basis for
reversal, he fails to support it with any authority or legal
analysis establishing why the trial court should have held such a
hearing. That failure precludes consideration of the argument's
merits. State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah
1984)(refusing to consider a issue that Amicone supported with no
legal authority or analysis). Moreover, defendant's claim
presents a legal question based on largely undisputed facts;
10

did not receive the level of representation guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, defendant has the burden of establishing t .wo
I
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establish that they fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
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evidentiary rearing, defendant must establish both el ements on
the trial record,

State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d at 175.
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hi , I he

record does ncr establish that defendant ever requested his
counsel to challenge the legality of his second sentence either
j_n

a motion

to correct the sentence

h)f-~*

^-^^^.

validity of counsel's decisions depends critically cr
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.

investigation

"I, 'J
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decisions are reasonable

[information suppiiea .,7 . ,

..

\ 11.11

^-r^nds critically on
Moreover, dnfendant

therefore, nc :-eed existed for ar> evidentiary hearing.

fired his counsel.only two and one-half months after sentencing,
and one and one-half months after filing his pro se motion to
correct sentence (R. 625, 739, 770). Defendant may have filed
the motion without first consulting his attorney and may have
already ceased all communications with his attorney.

Because the

existing record lacks any evidence of the bases for counsel's
conduct and the existing record suggests defendant began to
excluded counsel from defendant's decision to challenge the
sentence, it cannot support defendant's claim of deficient
performance.

State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.),

cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); StSte Y, Johnson, 823
P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991).
Second, defendant has not and cannot establish that
counsel's conduct undermines confidence in the outcome.
Counsel's failure to challenge the sentence's illegality at the
time the trial court imposed it or in a direct appeal in no way
impairs defendant's ability to raise the issue later.

Rule

22 (e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits defendants to
challenge the legality of sentences at any time.

Despite the

absence of a direct appeal from the sentencing, defendant can and
is fully litigating the legality of his sentence; therefore,
counsel's conduct has not affected the outcome.
12
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defendant
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a f f o r d e d b y U t a h Code A n n § 76-3-405 (1995)
Defendant h a s n o t
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b a r to a second h a r s h e r sentence after a s u c c e s s f u l c h a l l e n g e to
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395 U . S . 7 1 1 , 719-22 (1969) . D e f e n d a n t a l s o a r t i c u l a t e s n o claim
that t h e second s e n t e n c e v i o l a t e d the d u e p r o c e s s p r o s c r i p t i o n
against v i n d i c t i v e s e c o n d s e n t e n c e s .
Id, a! 7^^-"* r
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^

the State dismissed the mayhem (second degree felony) and
habitual criminal (first degree felony) charges; 3) the State
recommended reducing the aggravated assault conviction from a
third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor; and 4) the State
agreed that defendant could withdraw his plea if the trial court
did not grant the reduction (R. Ill, 113, Tr. April 21, 1988 at
2-3, 8). The trial court granted the reduction and sentenced
defendant accordingly, imposing a prison term not to exceed one
year to run concurrently with any other prison sentences.
Defendant successfully challenged the original plea on the
basis of a technical violation of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992).

After

the State put on seven witnesses at the retrial, defendant
initiated plea negotiations (R. 570-71, 863) . Pursuant to the
resulting agreement: 1) defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault, a third degree felony; and 2) the State dismissed the
mayhem and habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68) .
However, defendant did not ask for and the State did not again
recommend the classification reduction.

Consequently, the trial

court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison term of zeroto-five years to run consecutively with defendant's sentence on
the prior murder charge (R. 632, 881-82).
14

Utah Code
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on
•'' direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall
not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a
different offense based on the same conduct which is
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Estelle. 656 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1981) (u*an appellant's
successful challenge to his plea bargaining sentence is a tacit
repudiation of the bargain, allowing the Government to prosecute
him on the greater charges'") (citation omitted), cert, denied.
455 U.S. 953 (1992).

When parties rescind an agreement, the

courts must, to the extent possible, return them to their preagreement positions.
1986).

Dugan v. Jones. 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah

This requires the parties to give back the benefits they

received under the agreement.

See id.

In essence, the contract

is treated as though it never existed.

The same remedy generally

applies to a rescinded plea agreement.

SeefttertiinesV> Smith/

602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979) (if defendant is allowed to
withdraw his plea, fairness requires "that the case should revert
to its status on the original charge as it was before the
agreement to enter his plea of guilty")/ State v. Gentry. 797
P.2d 456, 459 n.4 (Utah App. 1990) (dicta) (acknowledging return
to pre-agreement positions is the usual remedy, but explaining
why it could not be applied in that case).
In this case, returning the parties to their pre-agreement
position requires treating defendant as though the trial court
had imposed no previous sentence because the trial court had
imposed no sentence at the pre-agreement stage. Therefore,
16

returning the parties io

^X^-LJL

pie-agreement position makes tl le

statute's protections inapplicable: because the trial court had
not sentenced df f Midniil '•' i • '"

''

" •

MLMMIV.

nl , i I,

statutes' protections had i.c: been triaaeiei.*
61^'^

i I i i} c: tl: ie:i i ,'MIJI I I, it;

—— ~—

l: v

-- f u l l b e n e f i t o f

the remedy to which defendant's rescission entitled it.
Defendant's rescission required him, r,. return all :f the benefit

from a third degree felonv to a class A misdemeanor.

If the

State L(.j"i ild never obtain anything more than a class A misdemeanor
sentence for third, second, and first degr ee fe3 oriips

r\pr

would retain the benefits he sought from, the repudiated agreement
c

result

would net return the parties to their pre-agreement positions.

fc

This approach w.
ciisc
. u trie proscriptions
1
established in Sorensen. As t
oreme court recognizee _.: . .a case, the statute precludes *
I# harsher sentence. State v.
Sorens £D
639 P.2d at. 180-Bl. Because returning the parties to
their pre-agreement positions requires treating the first
sentence as though it never existed, there is no prior sentence
with which to compare the sentence imposed on defendant's second
plea.
-:ieuuc*:.- .with ail three of
State could never
misdemeanor sentence,

t*i<aL
"
__„

ar.4 '

j+

"^ could, re-charge him
intends that the
single class A
— ^ - w m w ^ d j . Brief at 23.

Defendant correctly contends that nothing in section 76-3405 expressly excludes rescinded plea agreements from its
protections.

However, prior cases have recognized limitations on

section 76-3-405fs protections in situations not expressly
excluded by that section.

In State v. Babbel. 813 P.2d 86 (Utah

1991), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1036 (1992), the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that section 76-3-405 does not preclude correcting an
illegal sentence even though correcting the sentence may increase
it:

because the illegal sentence was void, it created no rights.

Id. at 88.
Here, defendant's rescission required him to relinquish any
rights he had to the original sentence and required the trial
court to return the parties to their pre-agreement positions.
Defendant's necessary relinquishment of any rights in the
original sentence equates to the lack of any rights Babbel had to
an illegal, but more lenient sentence.

Therefore, as in Babbel.

section 76-3-405, should not preclude defendant's second, harsher
sentence.
In sum, section 76-3-405 should not preclude imposing a
longer and consecutive prison term under the facts of this case.
When defendant challenged the original plea that resulted in the
prior, more lenient sentence, he rescinded the plea agreement
18

that generated that sentence
"Jj^.ii |. M

The parties ::ad r. -p returned to

ay r ehMm.nL ana pre-sentence posit^^iio, *.. --iiect,

treating the original sentence as thougn iu nad never existed
As a result, the statute'r protections had not been triggered.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY PERMITS PUNISHING DEFENDANT SEPARATELY
FOR THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND THE RESULTING REVOCATION
OF V*T? PAR~T.F ON " " - P T H P MURDER CONVICTION
In Point -.v of his supplemental brief, defendant c ontends
that, unless he receives credit against
£ ^

r

"

"

•

hi; aggravated assau-t

"

-•

-

-

;

~

••

revocation, the State w fci . Danish him twice icr the same offense.
According Lu defendant, this violates the proscription against
double jeopardy.
Defendant di:? r.ct make this argument t
lias aiqiied IU'JIIM I |" I 11 i 11 * i n n
appeal

i: xceptiuiial circumstances on

herefore, the Court need not consider the argument on •
. v. Brown. P56 P,2d ^ c o

its meritL

Alternatively, the argument
defendant'

inn

the trial court and

^~

/—-t- -

t a u . ,/K . * S merit.-.

'

t

i-

.. j. _ e

;

effect,

consecutive

sentence because the aggravated assault guil^v plea caused h v
parole revocation on the sentence for his mux der conviction.
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The

case law establishes the contrary: double jeopardy permits using
the same facts to support both a criminal conviction and a parole
revocation.

Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336# 1337 (Utah 1986).

Because the same conduct supports both the revocation of parole
on the prior sentence and defendant's sentence for his new
conviction, the trial court could impose a separate, consecutive
sentence for defendant's separate aggravated assault conviction.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE AND HAS NOT SUPPORTED HIS
APPELLATE CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT IMPOSE A
SECOND SENTENCE BECAUSE HE HAD SATISFIED THE FIRST
Finally, defendant contends that, because he completed the
class A misdemeanor sentence imposed on his original no-contest
plea, double jeopardy, due process, and equal protection
precluded imposing the statutory zero-to-five year prison term on
his second guilty plea to the same offense.

Defendant attempts

to draw a distinction between cases where an appellate court
vacates an active sentence with a case, such as this, where
defendant had actually completed the original sentence.
Defendant did not make this argument to the trial court and
has argued neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on
appeal.

Therefore, the Court need not consider the argument on

its merits.

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993);
20

State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992).
Moreover, defendant supports this argument with no analysis
or case authority.

He me

without establishing thai

:^iires a different result

independent ly IIM-1 le v MS
merits.

*_:

. . ....ung L:-IS ,^^im on the

i». --j^. -. ~^ \<*) \J,;

uuaLe v. Amic:;

oo^ r .2d

1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (refusing to consider a issue tna: Airiiccne
supported

> i I III n

II i I u

•. .

.

The constitutional protections against double jeopardy
.>

. o grant a^i^ixuant credit icr the time

he served on the original sentence against

" -.--*.

North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 XJ,S, 711, 718-21 (1969) .
('Mi1

. 'I1 '

1'iti " •'efendcint \: ii»i

original sentence

, Li Li U j .

'

skived

..

The trial
.:.-<;

Therefore, defendant received

all Llidt the constitution guaranteed him, in his second sentence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the State asks that the Court
a f f i i"in d e £ e n d a i "i I t w e 111: w J I e « .
ORAL .ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Whether L.a:* L^dt Ann

§ 7f •* **= /-.~~r>

second, more severe B ein t fi 11 <" i
first impression i n this State

prec i u( jed

the
11 j, e h L11.. i J i I
l

noted above, the statute does

not expressly exclude this case from its protections. Therefore,
the State seeks oral argument to address any questions the Court
may have about this issue.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\2>

day of /YltuJ

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-402

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 1210.

Am. Jur. 2cL — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 552.
C.J.S. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1522,
1523.

76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class
A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of
probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney,
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any personfromobtaining
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-402; 1983, ch. 88, § 6;
1991, ch. 7, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, twice substituted
"degree" for "category* in Subsection (1), inserted "third degree" and "class A" in the introductory paragraph of Subsection (2), twice inserted "class A" in Subsection (2Xa), added the

subsection designations in Subsection (2Kb),
added Subsections (2XbXiii) and (3), redesignated former Subsection (3) as present Subsection (4), and made minor changes in punctuation and style throughout the section.
Cross-References. — Expungement and
sealing of records, § 77-18-9 et seq.; Rule
4-207, Rules of Judicial Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeal.
Applicability of 1991 amendment.
Felonies.
Cited.

Appeal.
When a conviction is reduced under this
section, the appeal lies in the court having
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in
the judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of
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an adult defendant's juvenile history in the
pre-sentence report and its consideration by
the sentencing judge; the section prohibits use
of the juvenile record in the guilt phase of a
criminal trial, but not in the sentencing phase.
State v. McClendon, 611 R2d 728 (Utah 1980).

for the 90-day evaluation and impose the
proper prison sentence when the oral recommendation has not been made part of the judgment and, since it is not part of the judgment,
its rescission is not appealable. State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978).

Rescinding recommendation for evaluation.
Judge may rescind his oral recommendation
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 596.
CJJS. — 24 C J.S. Criminal Law § 1506.

AJLR. — Defendant's right to disclosure of
presentence report, 40 A.L.R.3d 681.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law ** 1208(2).

76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or
prior sentence set aside.
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously
satisfied.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-405.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
that he was required to appear at trial in prison
clothing, which allegation if true would constitute a violation of his constitutional due process
rights. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah
1980).

ANALYSIS

Appeal to district court from justice court.
Attorney's misstatement of law.
Finality of sentence.
In general.
Purpose of section.
Second sentence less severe.
Second sentence more severe.
Cited.
Appeal to district court from justice court.
At a trial de novo in district court on appeal
from a conviction in a justice court, district
court could not sentence defendant upon conviction to a more severe sentence than imposed
by justice court. Wisden v. District Court, 694
P.2d 605 (Utah 1984), aflTd, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah
1987).
Attorneys misstatement of law.
Defendant's allegation that he failed to appeal his conviction due to his attorney's advice
that he stood a substantial chance of receiving
a much harsher sentence upon a retrial, such
advice being a misstatement of the law as
provided by this section, entitled defendant to
challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of
habeas corpus where defendant also alleged
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Finality of sentence.
Concurrent sentences orally ordered by
judge, but not signed in order to continue
sentencing hearing for reconsideration of sentence, were not "set aside" on direct review or
collateral attack within the meaning of this
section. Therefore, the court's later imposition
of consecutive sentences did not violate this
section. State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
In general.
•Has section's prohibition against a more severe second sentence requires that the second
sentence cannot exceed the first sentence in
appearance or effect, in the number of its elements or in their magnitude; therefore, concerning the second sentence, no new element of
sentence can be added, no element can be
augmented in magnitude, and there can be no
tradeoff by increasing one element of a sentence by reference to a decrease in another
element. State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah
1981).

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-103

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assault against peace officer.
Evidence of assault.
—Sufficient.
Cited.
Assault against peace officer.
This section and i 76-6-102.4 do not proscribe identical conduct when the assault is
against a peace officer. The statutes apply to
different classes of persons, the former applying to "any person" and the latter applying to
•any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Evidence of assault.
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, the
videotape of all bookings, including the defen-

dant's, was erased and recycled after 72 hours if
there was no request to retain it, and the
defendant sought dismissal of the charge that
she, while in custody, had assaulted a police
officer, because there was no showing that loss
of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the issue
of the defendant's guilt, the trial court erred in
dismissing the assault charge. State v. Jiminez,
761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
—Sufficient.
Jury verdict, implicitly rejecting statutory
defenses of self-defense and defense of habitation, was supported by the evidence. State v.
Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah
C t App. 1994).

76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other
substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953,76-5-102.6, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 149, § 1; 1994, ch. 37, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, inserted "or otherwise propels.n

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 59 became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Spitting.
Spitting on a correctional officer was not a
crime under this section, as the only prohibited
means of propelling a substance or object was

by throwing. State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) (decided before 1994 amendment
adding "or otherwise propels").

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10;
1989, ch. 170, § 2.

Cross-References.—Attempt, § 76-4-101.
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.
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76-5-106

76-5-104. Consensual altercation no defense to homicide
or assault if dangerous weapon used.
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or
assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to
any duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course
of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 was used.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-104; 1989, ch. 170, § 3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery §§ 66, 68.
C.J.S. —6AC.J.S. Assault and Battery § 85.

Key Numbers. — Assault and Battery *=»
65.

76-5-105. Mayhem.
[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally deprives a human being
of a member of his body, or disables or renders it useless, or who cuts out or
disables the tongue, puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or Up, is guilty of
mayhem.
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-105, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, { 76-5-105.
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed subsec-

tion designation "(l)" was added by the compiler.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Instructions.
nose, instructions on defendant's intoxication,
In prosecution for mayhem, arising from de- flight, and intent were not erroneous. State v.
fendant's alleged biting offend of sister-in-law's Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 R2d 692 (1935).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mayhem and
Related Offenses § 1.

C.J.S. — 56 C.J.S. Mayhem § 3.
Key Numbers. — Mayhem «=» 7.

76-5-106. Harassment.
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to frighten or harass
another, he communicates in writing a threat to commit any violent felony.
(2) Harassment is a class C misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-106, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, S 76-5-106.
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT 76-8-1001
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sedition,
Subversive Activities, and Treason § 103.
C.J.S. — 46 C J.S. Insurrection and Sedition
§2.

Key Numbers. — Insurrection and Sedition
*=» 2.

PART 10
HABITUAL CRIMINALS
76-8-1001. Habitual criminal — Determination.
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for
felony ofiFenses at least one of which ofiFenses having been at least a felony of
the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have
been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the
second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state
prison for from five years to life.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1001, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 46, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Attempted first degree murder.
Since attempted first degree murder is not
excepted in the habitual criminal statute, trial
court did not err in using defendant's conviction for that crime as the underlying substantive offense to trigger the habitual criminal
statute. State v. Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. Rep.
6 (1989).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Attempted first degree murder.
Interpretation of statute.
No separate sentence.
Prior convictions.
—Burden of proof.
—Presumption of regularity.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Fact that habitual criminal statute allows
prosecutor discretion whether or not to charge
defendant under its provisions does not make it
unconstitutional. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d
1275 (Utah 1978).
This section and § 76-8-1002 do not violate
federal constitutional provisions against double jeopardy. The statutes do not create a new
crime; they merely enhance punishment for
the latest crime in cases where the defendant
has been previously convicted of and sent to
prison for two other felony offenses. State v.
Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985).
Separate and consecutive sentence for being
a habitual criminal subjected defendant to double jeopardy; his habitual criminal sentences
should have been merged with his sentences
for the underlying offenses. State v. Williams,
773 P.2d 1368 (1989).

Interpretation of statute.
Intent of this statute is to make persistent
offenders subject to greater sanctions, and not
to reform. Therefore, the particular sequence of
prior crimes is immaterial, and defendant was
treated properly where he had served only two
weeks of the first prior commitment when the
second prior commitment began to run. State
v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983).
Trial court properly instructed the jury that
the word "committed" means the order by
which a person is sent to prison, that each time
a person is ordered sent to prison in carrying
out a sentence, that person is being committed,
and that it is irrelevant whether multiple commitments are to be served concurrently or consecutively. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200
(Utah 1987).
No separate sentence.
This section does not create a new crime; it
merely enhances punishment for the latest
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exact equivalent of the latter. State v. Smith,
90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
Where rape with force or violence is charged,
assault is an included offense. State v. Smith,
90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
In criminal action charging defendant with
crime of carnally and unlawfully knowing a
female over age of thirteen years and under
age of eighteen years, it was proper for court to
instruct jury on lesser offense of attempt to
commit the crime. State v. Brande, 115 Utah
85, 202 P.2d 556 (1949).
The offense of simple assault is included in
the offense of indecent assault. State v. Close,
28 Utah 2d 144, 499 R2d 287 (1972).
Unanimous verdict
To fulfill the constitutional requirement of
jury unanimity, the jury must agree on a ver-

dict, but it is not necessary that they agree cm
the theory of guilt when the prosecution
presents evidence supporting alternative theories. State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987)
(second-degree murder); State v. Tillman, 750
P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (first-degree murder).
Verdict forms.
There is no statute in this state requiring
the court to prepare forms of verdict. It has,
however, been the general practice of-trial
courts to do that, and it might be that, when
they undertook to do so, they should have prepared forms as complete as the case requires
State v. Romeo, 42 Utah 46,128 P. 530 (1912),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Crank,
105 Utah 332, 142 PJ2d 178 (1943).
Cited in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah
1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial
§ 1750 et seq.
CJ.S. — 23ACJ.S. Criminal Law § 1395 et
•eq.
AX.R. — Inconsistency of criminal verdict
as between two or more defendants tried together, 22 AUELSd 717.
Juror's reluctant, equivocal or conditional
assent to verdict, on polling, as ground for mis-

trial or new trial in criminal case, 25 AJLJEUd
1149.
Validity and efficacy of accused's waiver of
unanimous verdict, 97 AX.R.3d 1253.
Requirement ofjury unanimity as to mode of
committing crime under statute setting forth
the various modes by which offense may be
committed, 75 A.L.R.4th 91.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «- 636(8),
870 to 894.

Rule 21.5. Repealed.
Repeals. — Rule 21.5, establishing procedure for pleas claiming mental illness or insan-

ity, was repealed effective January 1,1996. For
similar provisions, see i 77-16a-103.

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
* (b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
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(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
rf Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the
court shall *o specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investiAmendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective January 1, 1995, substituted gation, t 76-3-404.
\5 days" for "30 days" in the first sentence in
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing
Subdivision (a).
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E.
The 1996 amendment made several stylistic
Suspending imposition of sentence and placchanges to delete masculine pronouns and ing defendant on probation, S 77-18-1.
tided Subdivision <f).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Advising defendant of right to appeal
Appellate review.
Illegal sentence.
Jurisdiction.
Sentences.
—Habitual offenders.
—Indefinite suspension of sentence.
Sentencing hearing.
--Continued hearing.
—Evidence.
Delinquency record.
Polygraph examination.
—Presentence report
—Presence of counsel.
—Presence of defendant
—Time.
Continuance for defendant.
Waiver.
Statements before sentencing.
—Defendant
Validity of conviction.
Cited.
Advising defendant of right to appeal
Trial court's failure to again advise defendant of his right to appeal at sentencing was
harmless error where trial court had informed
him of such right at the trial and after the
verdict, and he did not object to the timeliness
of the court's advice. Crowe v. State, 649 PJ2d 2
(Utah 1982).
Appellate review.
Subdivision (e) of this rule permits the court
of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence
even if the issue is raised for the first time on
appeal. State v. Brooks, 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 5
(Utah 1995).
Subdivision (e) of this rule does not allow an
appellate court to review the legality of a sentence when the substance of the appeal is not a
challenge to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction. State v. Brooks, 278 Utah
Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1995).
Illegal sentence.
A district court may reassume jurisdiction to
correct an erroneous and void sentence, irrespective of the time limits. State v. Lee lim, 79
Utah 68, 7 P^d 825 (1932).
Defendant must first ask the trial court to
correct his sentence if he believes that it has
been imposed in an illegal manner. State v.

Brooks, 868 FM 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
affd, 278 Utah Adv. Bep. 5 (Utah 1995).
Jurisdiction.
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court
does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence
until the sentence has been corrected; however,
once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State
v. Montoya, 825 PJ2d 676 (Utah Ct App. 1991).
Sentences.
—Habitual offenders.
A justice of the peace, after imposing a fine
for drunkenness for violation of a city ordinance, could not thereafter impose a jail sentence under those provisions of ordinance providing for cumulative punishment for a second
or subsequent offense, without taking evidence
upon the question of the previous conviction.
Ex parte Mulliner, 101 Utah 51,117 P.2d 819
(1941).
—Indefinite suspension of sentence.
The court, by indefinitely suspending sentence, and permitting defendant to go on his
own recognizance, lost jurisdiction of him, so
that it could not afterwards have him rearrested, and sentence him. In re Flint, 25 Utah
838, 71 P. 531, 95 Am. S t R. 853 (1903).
Sentencing hearing.
—Continued hearing.
Failure to advise accused of nature of the
charge, his plea and the verdict thereon at a
sentencing proceeding which was a continuation of a prior sentence hearing was not reversible error where defendant was adequately apprised of that information in the initial proceeding, although it would have been preferable for defendant to have been advised of those
facts in the continued proceeding. State v.
McClendon, 611 PM 728 (Utah 1980).
—Evidence.
Delinquency record.
A record of delinquency is not admissible in
the guilt phase of a trial even though it is relevant and material to the issues, but the limitation goes only to the use of the delinquency
record as "evidence" and is not a bar to consideration in the sentencing phase of a criminal
case. State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah
1980).
Polygraph examination.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

